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On the weekend of August 16, the bunkering vessel Haigang Zhiyuan delivered 8,016 metric tonnes of domestically produced green methanol to the dual-fuel container ship CMA CGM Osmium at Yangshan Port in Shanghai. Shanghai Customs supervised the operation. It is the largest single green methanol bunkering on record. The operation brought together Shanghai Electric, Shanghai International Port Group, and CMA CGM, with the fuel supplied principally from Shanghai Electric's Taona

[Chattogram Coastal Road Photo by Samina Khondkar - Own work, CC BY-SA 4.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=148921351] On the morning of August 14, workers at the Ferdous Steel yard in Sitakunda, Bangladesh, were cutting an opening in the bottom of a ballast tank aboard a beached LNG carrier. Hydrogen sulphide escaped. Two men died where they stood. Seven more died in hospital. Among the dead was Motiur Rahaman, aged 17. Another was Abdul Alim Sujon, a safety

Two years after Houthi attacks pushed the container trades around the Cape of Good Hope, the largest carriers are transiting the Red Sea again. MSC sent seven boxships through the Suez Canal this month. Maersk returned its MECL service to the trans-Suez route in August, having made its first tentative transit in December. CMA CGM has been running services through the corridor since late last year. What is striking is not that the return is happening. It is how it is happening

On August 17, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers granted the federal permit authorizing construction of the Louisiana International Terminal at Violet in St. Bernard Parish, on the Lower Mississippi River downriver from New Orleans. The permit clears the last major regulatory hurdle for what Port NOLA describes as the only new greenfield container port currently under development in the United States. Construction is expected to take five years. The projected investment is roug

Every towing vessel subject to Subchapter M holds a Certificate of Inspection, and every COI was obtained through one of two routes. The Coast Guard issues the certificate either way. What differs is who verifies compliance, how often, and on whose schedule. Operators frequently treat this as a procedural detail settled once at the start of the phase-in and never revisited. It is not. The choice determines your annual cost structure, your exposure to scheduling risk, the amou

Speaking at a campaign event in Garden City, Long Island on August 14, President Trump told an audience of law enforcement officers that "after we finish defeating Iran, which is being very badly defeated, pretty soon I'll be declaring the Hormuz Strait a territory of the United States." He added, "Essentially, that's what it is. We have the blockade. No ships get through unless we want them to." Iran's Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi responded on X within hours. Th

An oil spill off the coast of Oman has spread across somewhere between 390 and 2,000 square kilometers, depending on whose satellite analysis you accept, and reached roughly 40 kilometers of mainland coastline near Ras Madrakah on August 12. The source is a half-sunk tanker called the Caroline Bezengi, aground in the Arabian Sea, leaking crude for approximately six weeks with no effective containment. The vessel is 81,085 gross tons. It has held no classification from an IACS

[Photo by Bayu Tiyo on Unsplash] Ask a bunker buyer who they bought their last stem from and you will usually get a company name. Ask what that company's role was in the transaction and the answer is less certain than it should be. The confusion is widespread and it is not the buyer's fault. The three roles in marine fuel supply are genuinely distinct in law and in risk, but the market presents them inconsistently, some companies perform more than one, and the commercial conv

[Image: USCGC Munro (WMSL-755), the cutter that pursued the Bella 1 across the Atlantic] On August 7, 2026, a 47-year-old Georgian national named Avtandil Kalandadze was sentenced in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia to ten months in federal prison. He will be deported when the term is served. The coverage framed it as a shadow fleet prosecution, which it is. What the coverage mostly did not say is that Kalandadze was not convicted of a sanctions offense. H

On July 19, 2024, a deckhand named among the five crew aboard the towing vessel Miss Peggy drowned in the galley of his own boat after it was struck from behind and rolled over in the Houston Ship Channel. Four of his shipmates got out. He did not. The National Transportation Safety Board released its investigation report on August 6, 2026. It runs 92 pages, and the finding at the center of it is one that every safety manager in the industry should read carefully, because it

Fuel is sold by mass and, for most of the industry's history, delivered by volume. That single mismatch is the origin of nearly every quantity dispute in bunkering, and it is the gap that decades of tradecraft have been built to exploit. The stakes have risen with the price. With VLSFO running past $910 per metric ton in the spring of 2026, a two percent discrepancy on a mid-sized stem costs upward of $15,000 before the vessel has left the berth. Service providers who conduct

Most operators treat renewal as a price negotiation. The broker goes to market, quotes come back, and the conversation is about which number is lowest and whether last year's terms can be held. That framing misses where the leverage sits. By the time quotes are being compared, the underwriter has already formed a view of the risk, and that view was built from the loss runs, the survey report, and a set of judgments about how the operation is run. For a small fleet, those judg

Ten years after it took effect, Subchapter M is no longer a new regulation. It is the operating framework for the entire U.S. towing industry, and the phase-in that occupied everyone's attention between 2016 and 2022 is long finished. What has replaced it is a renewal cycle, and that cycle is producing a specific set of problems right now for operators who obtained their first Certificate of Inspection early. Requirements that were deferred for five years are coming due, and

In March 2014, OW Bunker listed on the Copenhagen exchange. It was Denmark's third largest company by revenue and the largest marine fuel supplier in the world. Eight months later it was in bankruptcy, thirteen banks were owed $750 million, and shipowners across every major trading region were discovering that they might have to pay for the same bunkers twice. The collapse produced a decade of litigation across multiple jurisdictions, a UK Supreme Court decision that reclassi

There is a version of the shadow fleet story that treats it as somebody else's problem. Sanctioned states move sanctioned oil on ships nobody reputable would touch, Western regulators chase them with designations, and operators running clean tonnage on legitimate trades watch from a safe distance. That version is wrong in a specific and expensive way. The shadow fleet now represents a large enough share of global tanker capacity that legitimate operators share water, anchorag

A deckhand on your towboat and a rigger on your dock can be injured on the same day, doing work that looks broadly similar, and be covered by two entirely different legal systems with different insurance policies behind them. Get the classification wrong and you have an injured employee, a claim your policy does not respond to, and a lawsuit your workers' compensation coverage was never designed to defend. For Gulf Coast operators, this is not an abstract legal question. Harb

For five months the Hormuz crisis has been a tanker story. Crude carriers hit, product tankers rerouted, VLCCs priced out of transits they had made routinely for decades. LNG featured in the coverage mostly as a supply statistic, a fifth of global flows sitting behind a closed strait. That changed over the last week of July. Two vessels from the same fleet were struck in two different seas in four days, one of them left without propulsion in the middle of the Strait of Hormuz

Anyone who built a Venezuela compliance policy eighteen months ago is working from a document that is now actively misleading. In the space of six months the United States has gone from maintaining one of its most restrictive sanctions programs, including a quarantine of shadow fleet tankers lifting Venezuelan crude, to issuing more than a dozen general licenses that specifically authorize chartering vessels, obtaining marine insurance, and dealing with Venezuelan port author

There is a gap at the center of the marine fuel industry that catches operators out with striking regularity. A cargo of fuel can be delivered fully compliant with the ISO 8217 specification stated in the contract, pass an independent laboratory test against every parameter in the relevant table, and still wreck an engine. The specification and the engine's tolerance are two different things, set by two different bodies, for two different purposes, and the distance between th

Buying fuel looks, from a distance, like buying anything else. You ask for a price, you accept one, the product arrives, you pay. In practice, a bunker stem is a sequence of six or seven distinct stages, each generating its own document, and the buyer's leverage in any subsequent dispute is determined almost entirely by what was done, or not done, at the right stage. The uncomfortable truth of most bunker claims is that they were lost before anyone knew there was a problem. T

For five months, the working assumption across the industry has been that the Strait of Hormuz crisis, however severe, was a single-chokepoint problem with a single-chokepoint solution. Cargo could move west. Saudi crude could reach the Red Sea overland and load at Yanbu. The Cape route was expensive and slow but it existed. Every contingency plan drafted since February rested on the premise that one door was closed and another remained open. As of last Monday, that premise n